Lazy Thinking: How Cognitive Easing Affects the Decision Making Process of Business Professionals by Armenia, Gianmarco
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Honors College Theses Pforzheimer Honors College
5-1-2013
Lazy Thinking: How Cognitive Easing Affects the
Decision Making Process of Business Professionals
Gianmarco Armenia
Honors College, Pace University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/honorscollege_theses
Part of the Business Commons, and the Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Pforzheimer Honors College at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors College Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact
rracelis@pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Armenia, Gianmarco, "Lazy Thinking: How Cognitive Easing Affects the Decision Making Process of Business Professionals" (2013).
Honors College Theses. Paper 126.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/honorscollege_theses/126




How Cognitive Easing Affects the Decision 
































2 | P a g e  
 
Contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 3 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 4 
I. Literature Review .................................................................................................................................. 7 
A. System 1 & System 2 ......................................................................................................................... 7 
B. Cognitive Ease and Cognitive Strain ................................................................................................ 9 
C. Overconfidence ............................................................................................................................... 11 
D. Endowment ...................................................................................................................................... 13 
E. Herding ........................................................................................................................................... 16 
II. How Cognitive Ease Effects Business Decisions ............................................................................... 18 
A. Cognitive Easing and Overconfidence ............................................................................................ 18 
B. Cognitive Easing and Endowment .................................................................................................. 21 
C. Cognitive Easing and Herding ........................................................................................................ 22 
III. Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 25 
Questions: ............................................................................................................................................... 26 
IV. Results and Discussion ................................................................................................................... 30 
A. Questions 1, 2, 4 & 5 ...................................................................................................................... 30 
B. Question 3 ....................................................................................................................................... 32 
C. Word Association ............................................................................................................................ 33 
V. Conclusion to the Experiment ............................................................................................................. 35 
VI. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 37 
VII. References ....................................................................................................................................... 41 
VIII. Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 43 
 
  










This paper examines how business and financial decision making are influenced by behavioral 
biases such as cognitive ease, overconfidence, herding and the endowment effect. I do this in two 
ways. First, I show historical examples of irrational decisions and the detrimental effects on the 
individual, society, the company, and shareholders from these decisions. Second, I conduct a 
survey of business students to examine how susceptible they are to behavioral biases. I find that 
most students are in fact allowing cognitive easing to alter their decisions negatively.  
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Introduction 
 The human mind is a complex and wonderful instrument. To this day theories 
exist on how it operates and what exactly is stored within it. One of the most important 
things that occur within the human mind is the process of making decisions. The decision 
making process is vital to the entire human race. Every action performed, every choice 
made, and every event that occurs in one’s life is shaped by their decision making 
process. Therefore understanding how individuals make decisions can help shape final 
decisions. If this is the case, people can shape their decisions to steer them to more 
optimal outcomes.  
 Throughout history, it is clear that regretful decisions yielding negative outcomes 
have been made. One sector, in particular, where the decision making process is vital is 
the financial sector. The decisions made within this sector not only affect the financial 
well-being of the decision makers, but also that of society. Given the interconnected 
financial system, optimal decisions are not only needed but demanded. However, human 
beings are not always rational decision makers, and that is where the issue lies. They are 
often emotionally driven and therefore malleable to many biases, altering their decision 
making process.  
Humans tend to avoid stressful and demanding cognitive strain, often making 
them vulnerable to many biases. This “laziness” and desire for cognitive ease often 
invites individuals to a world of irrationality where the decisions made can be 
detrimental. This mental folly known as cognitive ease causes individuals, such as 
business executives and professionals, to make irrational and non-optimal decisions. 
Professionals, as well as most individuals, tend to believe they have full control of their 
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decisions. However, this is a fallacy. Several cognitive biases alter their decisions, 
resulting in negative outcomes. For example, there are CEOs who have an immense 
amount of knowledge, MBAs, lifetime amounts of training and experience, and yet still 
make mistakes that when realized in hindsight seem absolutely outrageous. These non-
optimal or inefficient decisions are a result of Cognitive ease. 
 Cognitive easing played an important role in the collapse of many, once great, 
companies such as Blockbuster, AOL, PanAm, and even more recently problems 
surrounding Hewlett Packard. In each of these companies executives made irrational 
decisions due to cognitive ease and as result not only hurt their company, but also the 
workers, suppliers, consumers and all other stakeholders. For example, Pan American 
Airlines’ CEO, William Seawell, made a careless decision in 1980 that would inevitably 
lead to the airlines demise. Seawell crafted the acquisition of National Airlines, through a 
bidding war, in order to bolster PanAm’s domestic routes. He purchased National for 
over four hundred million dollars and inadvertently increased PanAm’s debt severely. 
While the purchase of National helped grow Pan Am’s airline fleet, Seawell did not 
realize that he had paid much too high a price for the deal. Seawell also failed to analyze 
the enormous amount of debt Pan Am had already realized from the previous purchase of 
its larger Boeing aircrafts. After this deal was finalized, Seawell was replaced one year 
later. In addition, all efforts to decrease the company’s debt by the new CEO, Edward 
Acker, proved futile, followed by the collapse of PanAm. In the midst of the bidding war 
for National Airlines William Seawell’s continued effort to bid exuberantly regardless of 
the outrageous value National Airlines had already reached was irrational. Cognitively 
speaking, it was easier for him to go on and bid until the war was over. Deviating from 
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that bidding war required too much cognitive effort, analytical effort, and time, which ran 
the risk of losing National Airlines. Cognitive easing influenced Seawell’s irrational and 
careless decision, and with exposure to behavioral biases such as overconfidence, 
endowment and herding, these irrational decisions are even harder to avoid.  
This paper will discuss the different methods in which business professionals, 
mainly in the field of finance, think in response to cognitive ease and how those thinking 
processes, in conjunction with other behavioral biases, affect the way business 
professionals make decisions that bare monumental negative impacts on society. Within 
the following pages, the Literature Review will introduce and explain some of the major 
concepts such as system 1 and 2 as well as cognitive easing. This section will also 
describe, in detail, three behavioral biases that cognitive easing helps to play a role in. 
These biases are overconfidence, herding, and endowment. Section two will describe 
several historical situations, within business, that depict how cognitive easing and these 
behavioral biases influence one another in causing professionals to make irrational 
decisions. Sections three and four, will discuss my experiment depicting the presence of 
cognitive easing in both undergraduate and graduate business students.  
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I. Literature Review 
A. System 1 & System 2 
 
Human beings have a gift many other living organisms do not possess. Humans 
possess the ability to think in various manners such as simple concise thinking or 
analytical thinking often related to problem solving. Specifically, these two thinking 
patterns are known as System 1 and System 2, respectively (Khaneman).  
“System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense 
of voluntary control” (Khaneman 20). This thinking pattern can be identified as 
instantaneous or primal. For example, System 1 is used to solve a simple mathematical 
equation such as 1+1. It requires little to no concentration and can be solved almost 
effortlessly, cognitively speaking. “The capabilities of System 1 include innate skills that 
we share with other animals. We are born prepared to perceive the world around us, 
recognize objects, orient attention, avoid losses, and fear spiders” (Khaneman 21). 
Normally, individuals do not even realize that they are using System 1. The thought to 
“orient to the source of a sudden sound, detect hostility in a voice, [or] completing the 
phrase bread and …” (Khaneman 21) are all part of the System 1 way of thinking.   
“System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, 
including complex situations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the 
subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration” (Khaneman 21). System 2 
requires more attention and concentration, resulting in a lengthier and more strenuous 
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thought process. This thinking pattern can be often related to activities such as “bracing 
for the starter gun in a race, filling out a tax form, [and] checking the validity of a 
complex logical argument” (Khaneman 22). Therefore, System 2 would not be used or 
needed when trying to solve a simple mathematical equation such as 1+1, but mandatory 
when trying to solve a more complex equation such as 17*43. 
Due to System 2’s need for cognitive effort, it is less likely for System 2 to 
operate under conditions in which someone’s mental effort has depleted. If an individual 
is cognitively busy, exhausted, or under the influence of temptation, System 2 is less 
likely to operate. Many of these situations, such as temptation, require high levels of self-
control which demands a high level of cognitive effort (Khaneman). Therefore, an 
individual who is dieting while in the vicinity of delicious desserts is more likely to make 
an irrational or non-optimal decision. This effect was demonstrated through a study that 
involved parole judges in Israel who spend their entire days reviewing parole 
applications.   
The cases are presented in random order, and the judges spend little time on each 
one, an average of 6 minutes. (The default decision is denial of parole; only 35% 
of requests are approved. The exact time of each decision is recorded, and the 
times of the judges' three food breaks--morning break, lunch, and afternoon 
break--during the day are recorded as well.) The authors of the study plotted the 
proportion of approved requests against the time since the last food break. The 
proportion spikes after each meal, when about 65% of requests are granted. 
During the two hours or so until the judges' next feeding, the approval rate drops 
steadily, to about zero just before the meal. (Khaneman 43) 
When the judges were hungry and depleted of their own mental resources, system 2 was 
absent. Due to this absence, they spent little time analyzing the applicant for parole and 
simply rejected him or her. However when the judge had eaten the approval rating 
increased quite significantly because system 2 was present so that the judges were more 
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careful to analyze the applicant’s qualifications for parole. This can also occur to 
professionals in business sector who may be physically exhausted and are asked to make 
decisions. Their mental resources are most likely depleted and the decision they make 
will most likely have regrettably lasting outcomes. 
 Systems 1 and 2 are not always independent from each other.  Individuals use 
both systems in their everyday lives and at they act as complements: 
The division of labor between System 1 and System 2 is highly efficient: it 
minimizes effort and optimizes performance. The arrangement works well most 
of the time because system 1 is generally very good at what it does: its models of 
familiar situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually accurate as 
well, and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate 
(Khaneman 25). 
Unfortunately, System 1has limitations and does not always result in accuracy. Its 
primitive thinking pattern limits it from assessing statistical or logical situations 
precisely. This issue often causes System 1 to yield simpler responses than intended 
(Khaneman). Unlike System 2, System 1 is always running in the background of an 
individual’s mind and it cannot be turned off. Due to its twenty-four hour service, System 
1 often interrupts situations that require System 2, which often causes an inefficient final 
decision.  
B. Cognitive Ease and Cognitive Strain 
 
Cognitive ease is the mental state in which “things are going well – no threats, no 
major news, no need to redirect attention or mobilize effort” (Khaneman 59). If an 
individual’s thought process has successfully utilized System 1, in that it required no 
extra effort by System 2 to complete the said task, that individual is experiencing 
cognitive ease. Cognitive strain on the other hand, “indicates that a problem exists, which 
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will require increased mobilization of System 2” (Khaneman 59). Each mentality induces 
different emotional stimuli and often results in various outcomes. 
When under cognitive ease, individuals make decisions in a completely different 
manner than when under cognitive strain. Cognitive strain triggers the mind to use 
System 2’s extra resources and analyze the situation more thoroughly. The use of these 
extra resources tends to result in the individual solving the problem correctly or making a 
better decision. Shane Fredericks’ “Cognitive Reflection Test” or CRT attempted to 
prove this theory by giving out tests including mathematical questions that would evoke 
an immediate intuitive answer that is incorrect. To simulate cognitive strain, two tests 
were written with identical questions, except one test had a smaller, slightly illegible, font 
and the other had a normal legible font. The smaller font induced cognitive strain, while 
the legible font did not. The result showed that “90% of the students who saw the CRT in 
normal font made at least one mistake in the test, but the proportion dropped to 35% 
when the font was barely legible” (Khaneman 65). “Cognitive strain, whatever its source, 
mobilizes System 2, which is more likely to reject the intuitive answer suggested by 
System 1” (Khaneman 65). Cognitive strain forces the mind and individual to avoid its 
lazy tendencies and work harder, thus triggering System 2. 
Knowing that system two is triggered in situations that instill cognitive strain can 
be helpful in many professional settings. Successful managers and executives are able to 
inspire their workers to perform their absolute best. This is not an easy task to accomplish 
and in situations where a company needs to change/increase performance, managers need 
to inspire their workers to perform better. One way this can be done is by inducing slight 
cognitive strain. Managers can create a sense of urgency. “Perhaps the best way to 
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challenge the status quo is for a leader to forcefully create a sense of urgency” (Dess, 
Lumpkin and Eisner 415). This urgency will induce cognitive strain and trigger System 2, 
and by doing so enable individuals to use more resources in order to analyze situations 
better and make ideal decisions. 
C. Overconfidence 
 
Overconfidence is defined as the “inaccurate, overly positive perceptions of one’s 
abilities or knowledge” (Moore and Kennedy 719). Furthermore, “individuals not only 
tend to have positive self-perceptions, they often believe they are more talented and 
competent than others, even when they are not” (Moore and Kennedy 718). This 
perception can include a greater sense of strength, intelligence, and experience.  “In short, 
people think they are smarter and have better information than they actually do” 
(Pompian 51). As overconfidence increases, people are more likely to act irrationally and 
put themselves in situations that they cannot handle. 
The overconfidence bias is often present within investment. Whether the 
individual is investing in the stock market, bond market, or playing casino slot machines 
overconfidence often plays a key role. Michael Pompian discusses two types of over 
confidence that affects investors: “prediction overconfidence” and “certainty 
overconfidence”. Prediction overconfidence occurs when “confidence intervals that 
investors assign to their investment predictions are too narrow” (Pompian 52). Investors 
perceive that their investment prediction will be more favorable than they actually will 
be. This is often caused by blindness from their overconfident behavior. Certainty 
overconfidence occurs when “investors are often also too certain of their judgments” 
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(Pompian 52). When an investor makes a decision that he/she follows through with 
regardless of the available information (often in disagreement with their decision) they 
are a victim of certainty overconfidence. Certainty overconfidence occurs after the 
decision has been made, while prediction overconfidence occurs when attempting to 
make a decision. Investors who are victimized by both types of overconfidence bias 
frequently make irrational decisions that may not be optimal to him/her and to the 
market. 
In the financial sector, overconfidence has a considerable effect on not only the 
individual’s well-being, but also that employee’s firm. Many studies have found that 
upper management positions have been affected by this behavioral bias. An experiment 
conducted by Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate examines the “relation between 
corporate decision-making and personal characteristics of the leading executive inside the 
corporation” ( Malmendier and Tate 35).The experiment determined how overconfident a 
CEO may or may not be depending on the investment choices he or she makes within the 
company. The conclusion found “a strong positive relationship between the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow and executive overconfidence” ( Malmendier and Tate 35). This 
over confident behavior by investors, including average brokers and high net worth 
CEOs, can cause damaging market fluctuations. Specifically, this behavior often results 
in market calamities such as bubbles. It is essential to require a “need to more fully incor-
porate behavioral aspects (like investor overconfidence) into investor decision-making 
models” (Evanoff, Kaufman and Malliaris 2). Incorporating such behavioral aspects will 
help decrease irrational decisions which in return create more stable and optimal market 
conditions. 




  The endowment effect is a behavioral bias which causes individuals to add more 
value to possessions or ideas they own, more than those they do not own. “The 
endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object 
than they are willing to spend to acquire it” (Huck, Kirchsteiger and Oechssler 1). This 
bias causes irrational behavior because it contests the basic principles of economics:  
Endowment bias is inconsistent with standard economic theory, which asserts that 
a person’s willingness to pay for a good or an object should always equal the 
person’s willingness to accept dispossession of the good or the object, when the 
dispossession is quantified in the form of compensation (Pompian 138). 
When the individual is endowed with a particular object they own, they will not sell it at 
the market price for which they would rationally purchase it. Dan Ariely describes three 
reasons why the endowment effect occurs in humans in his book, Predictably Irrational. 
He states that humans become endowed to objects or ideas because humans fall in love 
with what they have, humans focus on the losses more heavily than they do gains, and 
they assume that the opposite party in a transaction will perceive the transaction similarly 
(Ariely, Predictably Irrational 174-75). Each of these reasons contest basic economic 
principles and cause individual to make irrational decisions. 
 One of the most important reasons for why the endowment effect has such a great 
effect on individuals is loss aversion. Loss Aversion occurs because “changes that makes 
things worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains” (Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler 199). As stated previously, individuals tend to focus on losses more so than they 
do gains. This causes them to experience a greater pain when losing something, than 
feeling joy from gaining that same object. Loss aversion is very common in the financial 
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sector, especially regarding investors. Investors tend to hold on to losing stocks more so 
than onto winning stocks. This is not only counterintuitive but irrational. A winning 
stock, in the short term, is statistically likely to continue rising. Therefore, one should 
hold on to it longer. Instead investors sell the stock before it reaches its peak to make a 
profit. On the other hand, they become attached to stocks that continue to fall because the 
loss hurts more than the gain produces joy. They become so attached to the stock that 
they cannot let go of it unless they can break even. Instead they fail to understand that the 
stock will statistically continue falling and they will continue to lose money (Pompian 
210). This example of loss aversion also coincides with the endowment effect as the 
investors become endowed to the stock due to loss aversion. The endowment effect 
restricts them from understanding the statistics behind investing and instead they invest 
using their emotions rather than their logic. 
  Another study was conducted by William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser to 
illustrate the endowment effect within investments. They conducted an experiment in 
which they told investors to imagine that they would acquire one of four given 
investment options. These investment options included: a moderately risky stock, a 
riskier stock, a treasury security, and a municipal security. A second group had been 
given the same choices accept that they were required to imagine that they had already 
inherited one of the securities and could cede the inheritance at any time without any 
penalty (Pompian 141). The experiment concluded that the investors showed signs of 
endowment to the investments they had inherited because most of the investors did not 
give up the initial inheritance. The experiment showed that “the investors in the second 
group showed a tendency to retain whatever was “inherited.” This is a classic case of the 
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endowment bias. Most wealth management practitioners have encountered clients who 
are reluctant to sell securities bequeathed by previous generation” (Pompian 141). The 
endowment effect can have unfortunate results for investors. As stated earlier, when this 
is coupled with loss aversion, it can cause investors to make irrational decisions, often 
causing them to lose money. 
The endowment effect does not only come into play when an individual buys or 
invests in a physical object. Individuals could also become endowed to ideas: 
Once we take ownership of an idea – whether it’s about politics or sports – what 
do we do? We love it perhaps more than we should. We Prize it more than it is 
worth. And most frequently, we have trouble letting go of it because we can’t 
stand the idea of its loss. What are we left with then? An ideology - rigid and 
unyielding (Ariely, Predictably Irrational 177-78).  
Once an idea is endowed, it is hard for that individual to part from it. This occurs because 
they become emotionally attached to their idea as they would to a car they owned. If the 
idea is created by the person becoming endowed to it, the effect becomes even stronger. 
This is known as the “Ikea effect” and its usage with physical and non-physical objects. 
The Ikea effect was created by Dan Ariely and Mike Norton. It states that individuals add 
more value to objects and ideas that were created by them more so than those that are not 
created by them. A book shelf that was bought at Ikea and built by the individual will 
have more value, in the owners perspective, than that same book shelf being bought 
already built. This is mainly due to the emotional investment and time put into building 
the book shelf. Dan Ariely conducted an experiment to demonstrate this theory using 
origami. He allowed students to make origami figures and then bid on them, comparing 
the creators’ bids with the non-creators’ bids. The experiment showed that the creators on 
average bid much higher than the non-creators did for the same origami (Ariely, The 
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Upside of Irrationality 93). The “difference between creators and non-creators was not in 
how they viewed the art of origami in general but in the way that the creators came to 
love and overvalue their own creations” (Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality 94). This 




Herding is the behavior associated with humans who follow what other people are 
doing rather than their own intuition. What makes this behavior irrational is that the 
people they are following often contest what they believe is optimal, based on the 
information they hold. Herding is pervasive in the financial sector. “Herding, that is, 
imitation among investors, is said to appear in markets when, instead of following their 
own beliefs and private information, investors decide to imitate the decisions of other 
traders, who they perceive to be better informed” (Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela 2). In 
particular, investors who herd often switch their stance on investing (buying or selling) 
based on what other investors may be doing or how the market shifts. “Start with a trader 
who before any observable price changes has a trade (buy or sell) in mind. We say that 
this trader engages in herding behavior if he switches from selling to buying in the face of 
rising prices, or if he switches from buying to selling in the face of falling prices” (Park 
and Sgroi 8). If prices in the market increase, a trader will shift from buying to selling 
and if prices decrease he/she will do the opposite. In this situation, the investor is simply 
doing what most other investors are doing and not taking into any consideration his or her 
own understanding of the shifts occurring in the market. This behavior is irrational 
because it is not optimal for the market and goes against the efficient market hypothesis.  
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The efficient market hypothesis describes the shift from buying to selling (or vice 
versa) by investors due to new or acquired information. Herding effectively disrupts that 
idea. This “investor behavior can cause price fluctuations that are not necessarily due to 
new information arrival, but to the emergence of collective phenomena such as herding 
behavior” (Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela 2). When an investor herds, he/she is not 
using any information to make the decision to buy or sell, instead he/she is reacting the 
way others do. This behavior is not optimal to the market and can result in market 
disruptions such as asset price bubbles.  
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II. How Cognitive Ease Effects Business Decisions 
 
Now that I have described in detail the main concepts behind the issue, that 
professional within the business sector are prone to making non-optimal decisions due to 
cognitive ease, in this section I will survey the literature to show how cognitive easing 
takes place within business decisions. Cognitive easing is as present in the business sector 
as it is in everyday life. The effects it has on the thought and individual decision-making 
process result in irrational and detrimental decisions. Cognitive easing’s interference with 
both System 1 and 2 thinking patterns may either cause behaviors related to behavioral 
biases or enhance their usage and detrimental effects. In the following sections, I will 
discuss both past and recent examples of how cognitive easing further effects or induces 
overconfident behavior, endowment effects, and herding tendencies.  
A. Cognitive Easing and Overconfidence 
 
Cognitive easing causes individuals to use System 1 in situations where System 2 
would be more optimal. System 1’s emotionally driven nature causes individuals to 
become overconfident. In this case, professionals, such as investors, advisors, and 
executives become overconfident through cognitive easing and its persuasive nature of 
letting one’s mind rest from using system 2. More recently, the business sector has 
witnessed the effects of overconfident investors and CEOs and their hubristic behavior. 
The Time Warner and AOL Merger (1999-2000) and the most recent Hewlett Packard 
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and Autonomous merger (2012) are prime examples of cognitive easing and its effect on 
CEO decision making process and their vulnerability to overconfident behavior. 
CEOs, regardless of their expertise, are susceptible to overconfident behavior as 
much as anyone else. The decisions most CEOs make require extensive thought, 
statistical analysis, and concentration. Many of these decisions involve investments 
within the company, including, but not limited to, the introduction of new products or 
services, the expansion of the company into other industries, the expansion into another 
region, as well as mergers and acquisitions. These decisions cannot be made quickly, but 
should be carefully examined, understood, and finally executed. These decisions require 
System 2. Due to cognitive easing and the added behavioral bias of overconfidence, 
many of these decisions are made using system 1 instead. Overconfidence is driven by 
emotion, similarly as system 1 is, and together they result in irrational decisions.  
CEOs quite often exhibit excessive overconfidence about the future potential of 
their business leading to overvaluation of the firms. As individuals, the CEOs are 
driven by emotions which may lead them to believe, for example, that they have 
better skill than the average CEO, the risk they face are relatively low, and the 
expected cash flows are higher than average (Ottoo 4). 
These overconfident CEOs over value their skills and as a result, through cognitive 
easing, fail to statistically analyze data, devote ample time to the decision making process 
and propose ultimatums. They simply decide using System 1.  
 The AOL and Time warner merger can be considered one of the worst business 
mergers in history. The merger itself was fueled by overconfident CEOs and an internet 
bubble which led to overvalued companies. Time Warner CEO at the time, Gerald Levin, 
was encapsulated by AOL’s high stock price and impressive success. Enamored by the 
obvious bubble, Levin did not question AOL’s clear overvaluation. He strongly believed 
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in market prices and that AOL was not overvalued. This was demonstrated by his 
decision to not require a collar for the acquisition, in a case that there would be serious 
fluctuations in stock price between then and the time of the merger’s completion 
(Forbes). Levin allowed his overconfidence in AOL’s most recent success, blind his 
rational perception of the company. He was a victim of the Law of Small Numbers and 
cognitive easing. This acquisition required Levin to examine AOL’s financials and 
prospective future financials more thoroughly, but instead he did not. “Managers with 
overconfidence profiles tend to underestimate (overestimate) the risks (synergy gains) 
associated with mergers and are therefore less likely to postpone an acquisition decision” 
(Doukas and Petmezas 2). During a period when an internet bubble was clearly present, 
the decision to go forth with the acquisition of a clearly overvalued internet company is 
irrational and irresponsible.  
 More recently, Hewlett Packard (H.P.) was involved in a predicament with a 
British software developer, Autonomy. H.P. acquired Autonomy for $11.1 billion, “or an 
eye-popping multiple of 12.6 times Autonomy’s 2010 revenue” (Stewert). H.P. was 
criticized by analysts and shareholders alike for over paying for the acquisition of 
Autonomy. In fact, as stated in a New York Times article written by James B. Stewert, 
From H.P., a Blunder That Seems to Beat All, H.P. admitted that “it had overpaid by an 
astonishing 79 percent” (Stewert).  Leo Apotheker, the CEO at the time of the 
acquisition, was blinded by his own hubris and overconfident behavior. He did not take 
the time to reconsider the price for autonomy, bearing in mind the immense internal and 
external opposition. Catherine A. Lesjak, the current CFO at H.P. publically opposed the 
deal. She allegedly made “an impassioned presentation to the board and argued that 
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the deal wasn’t in the best interests of shareholders” (Stewert). Unfortunately for 
H.P., Leo Apotheker could not see beyond his pride and utilize System 2 to make the 
appropriate decision. Instead, he continued to justify the overpayment by stating 
“together with Autonomy we plan to reinvent how both structured and unstructured 
data is processed, analyzed, optimized, automated and protected” (Stewert), a clear 
over justification to a blatant decision that hurt H.P. and can be considered as one of 
the worst business decisions made in history. 
B. Cognitive Easing and Endowment 
 
 The endowment effect is a major issue within the financial sector. Professionals 
are constantly affected by this bias and they are not necessarily aware of it. Cognitive 
easing and its impact on the decision making process only adds to the detrimental 
properties of the endowment effect. In most cases, these individuals become endowed 
because they do not statistically analyze the data and situation at hand. Cognitive easing 
bars their use of System 2, and in return the endowment effect is triggered or enhanced.  
 One of the major issues that arise, when an individual falls victim to the 
endowment effect, is that he/she tends to remain at the status quo. One of the main 
elements of an effective and successful leader is “overcoming barriers to change” (Dess, 
Lumpkin and Eisner 401). One major barrier to change is having vested interests in the 
status quo. CEOs become endowed to certain ideas and investments leading to the 
resistance of anything that opposes the status quo. This causes an issue because many of 
these CEOs become endowed to ideas or investments that produce no value to the 
company and actually hurt the company. If cognitive easing had not initially caused the 
endowment effect, it could further complicate the situation by dissuading the CEO from 
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using system two to further analyze the situation and idea. Many CEOs have become 
vested in the status quo due to both the endowment effect and cognitive easing. One such 
CEO who demonstrated the detrimental effects of this bias was Jim Keyes, a former CEO 
of Blockbuster. 
 During an immense period of technological innovation, when the internet was 
becoming more and more common, Jim Keyes continued to disregard it. The media rental 
industry had been changing and innovation was crucial. CEOs such as Reed Hastings, 
who co-founded Netflix, understood this and took advantage by investing heavily in 
online streaming. Jim Keyes on the other hand was preoccupied with the status quo and 
was reluctant to move forward. He actually discontinued Blockbuster’s online service and 
disregarded online streaming entirely. Blockbuster would not reinstate their online and 
streaming services until about a year before its bankruptcy. Unfortunately, this proved to 
be too late as key competitors such as Netflix and Cable providers had already saturated 
the market with similar services. Keyes had fallen victim to cognitive easing. As CEO he 
failed to use system two to analyze the industry trends and forecast where the markets 
were heading. Even when it was clear that the internet was becoming an amazing tool for 
businesses, he vested his interests in what he believed was right for the company, failing 
to analyze why competitors were performing better. 
C. Cognitive Easing and Herding 
 
Unlike the other behavioral biases, herding involves a group of individuals falling 
victim to cognitive ease rather than one. When individuals herd, they are not using 
System 2 at all. Instead cognitive easing is causing them to be lazy and simply follow 
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everyone else. If System 2 had been in effect the individuals would analytically and 
systematically make a decision based on their own research and data. As was stated 
earlier, this behavior is a major contributor to asset bubbles and the calamities that ensue 
thereafter. 
In the mid to late 90’s, herding played a key role in the internet or dot-com 
bubble. Internet companies were emerging from all areas. Initially they were not being 
valued much, but within an instance, almost overnight, their stocks soared. John Cassidy 
describes the situation well in his book How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic 
Calamities: 
To Begin with, institutional investors shied away from dot-com stocks, citing a 
chronic lack of revenues and profits, and it was mainly individual investors who 
bought them. This divergence didn’t last long. As many technology stocks 
doubled, tripled, and quadrupled, those investment managers who had shunned 
them struggle to keep pace with the market average (Cassidy 179) 
After the stocks exponentially rose, all these investors could not afford to disregard these 
investments. They watched as everyone else contributed to the hysteria and indulged in 
the massive returns these investments offered. Many may wonder why this was a 
problem, considering the profits.  The main issue was that these investors were herding 
and investing based on noise rather than legitimate information. Even worse was that 
some understood that a bubble was forming, and instead of leaping off of it, they simply 
rode it to the end, where they could try their luck at evacuating seconds before the burst. 
“The sight of sophisticated investors knowingly helping to pump up a bubble was doubly 
destructive to the efficient market hypothesis” (Cassidy 181). Herding is a major 
contributor to market calamities, and its understanding is important to reduce such 
destructive instances. 
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A majority of the companies being invested in were blatantly overvalued. With 
simple investigation of the company’s financial reports and a few calculations it was very 
clear as to how overvalued they were. Many of these investors refused to look into the 
data and analyze how exactly so many of these newly established internet companies 
were reaching record breaking values in record breaking times. These investors were 
clearly only using System 1. Those who used System 2 would have successfully valued 
the companies at their true worth and strayed away from what can only be described as 
ticking time bombs. Unfortunately this was not the case, and as evidenced by history, the 
bubble did burst and in turn hurt the entire financial sector, economy, and most 
importantly society. 
Unfortunately, the dot-com bubble did not teach most of the world a lesson as 
demonstrated by the housing crises in 2008. Similarly to the dot-com bubble, the housing 
bubble was also partially fueled by herding mentality. During the time leading up to the 
housing crisis, derivative and collateralized debt obligation trading along with the issuing 
of credit default swaps became the primary business looming over Wall Street. Many 
financial institutions involved themselves in the activity based on its popularity by others. 
This was also the case with certain companies and firms issuing mortgages to individuals 
who were not eligible or capable of taking on such debt. Many of these firms possessed 
the adequate resources to analyze the risk involved in such activities but refused to pay 
much if any attention to it. They used System 1 to make a simple decision. Cognitive 
easing made clear the connection between trading derivatives and issuing mortgages and 
the very high short term returns they produce. Other firms understood the risk involved in 
such trading and neglected their own stance to herd and follow the majority. They too 
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were affected by cognitive easing and their decision to herd reflected their neglect of 
System 2. Herding in effect led majority of the industry into a risky business that was 
helping fuel a disastrous bubble. If cognitive easing did not take place, many of the 
decisions made by investors and executives could have possibly led to avoidance of the 
crash, or at the very least a softer blow to the economy.  
III. Methodology 
 
 In order to assess the impact of cognitive ease, I created an experiment in which I 
tested the presence of cognitive ease in both undergraduate and graduate students. This 
was done through a series of questions that test the individual’s use of either System 1 or 
System 2. The results to this experiment will help to depict how exposed business 
professionals, in the field, may be to cognitive ease. 
Participants: One hundred and seven undergraduate and graduate students had 
participated in taking a short questionnaire. Most of the participants who were part of the 
experiment graduated, or are expected to graduate, with a business or economics degree 
and/or works in the business sector. The participants were not compensated. 
Procedure: The participants were given a short five minute, quiz like, questionnaire 
testing their thinking pattern. Each question required the individual to channel their 
mental capacity toward using either System 1 or System 2 thinking. The Questionnaire 
involved a series of mathematical, word association, and true and false based questions. 
Many of these questions were taken from Daniel Khaneman’s book, Thinking Fast and 
Slow. The questions used are known as Cognitive Reflection Test questions. These 
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questions are meant to test an individual’s ability to suppress intuitive but wrong answers 
that are triggered by System 1 rather than the correct but less noticeable answer triggered 
by System 2. 
Questions:  
One: A bat and ball cost $1.10. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?  
Answer: $.05 
 This simple mathematical question, devised by Shane Frederick is known as a 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) question. It tests the individual’s use of either System 1 
or System 2 thinking. At an initial glance, most individuals will answer this question by 
stating that the ball costs $.10. This answer is brought about through System 1 and 
cognitive ease. When reading the question, the mind picks up that the bat and ball both 
cost $1.10, and if the bat is one dollar more than the ball, than through simple subtraction 
the ball must cost $.10. The fact of the matter is that subtraction is not even used to derive 
the correct answer. If the ball cost $.10, and the bat was a dollar more, then the bat would 
cost $1.10 leading to a total price of $1.20, $.10 more than what the question indicated 
the ball and bat were priced together. System 1 does not allow the individual to make that 
connection.  
Using System 2, the subject is more likely to arrive at the correct answer. Since 
this question requires a little more analysis than initially believed to, System 2 is the 
appropriate thinking pattern to apply. Whatever the individual prices the ball at, the bat 
will be one dollar plus that price. Therefore, the only possible answer could be $.05. If 
the ball was $.05, the bat would be $1.05 resulting in a total cost of $1.10, as stated in the 
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question. Another way to arrive at that solution would be to write the question out 
algebraically. The price of the ball is the unknown or “x”. Therefore the equation would 
equal: x + (1 + x) = $1.10. This can be re-written to 1 + 2x = $1.10, which is simplified to 
2x = $.10. Simplifying that further will allow one to arrive to the solution of $.05. As you 
can see, the question itself requires very simple algebra. 
Two: All roses are flowers. Some flowers fade quickly. Therefore some roses fade 
quickly. 
Answer: False 
This question presents the participant with a logical argument, and is asked to 
state whether the argument is true or false. Participants will be expected to state that the 
argument presented is true, but that is incorrect. The reason that some roses do not fade 
quickly, is simply due to the fact that there may be no roses among the flowers that do 
fade quickly. Therefore, some roses do not fade quickly (Khaneman 45). Given the 
information, most individuals immediately come to the conclusion that it is true, through 
the use of System 1. They then do not allow System 2 to process the conclusion and 
simply move on to the next question.  
Three: Approximately how many murders occur in the state of Michigan in one year? 
Answer: 450-600 
 Question three is a factual based question, simply asking participants what they 
believe the murder rate in Michigan is in a typical year. This question challenges the 
individual’s use of System 2. The focus of this question is to allow System 2 to make a 
connection between Michigan and one of its major cities, Detroit. Because Detroit is 
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statistically a high crime city, the connection made would support a higher estimate of 
murders.  This connection is rarely ever made by participants due to the lack of using 
System 2, because of cognitive ease. In most instances participants will be expected to 
underestimate the murder rate and give a number far less than what the rate actually is. In 
this case, the most recent statistic found for the reported number of murders in Michigan 
was six hundred and thirteen (FBI). Any answer given below four hundred and fifty was 
considered an underestimation.  
Four:  If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
Answer: 5 Minutes. 
 This problem is similar to that of question one. It is also a CRT question devised 
by Shane Frederick. Most participants answer this question with one hundred, assuming 
that it takes one minute to make one widget. This is incorrect. If it took one minute to 
make one widget, five machines would have made five widgets in one minute, assuming 
each machine was making one widget. System 1 has individuals believe that logic 
through cognitive ease. It is often the first conclusion that comes to one’s mind and 
therefore it is the least stressful to the mind. It actually takes five minutes for any number 
of machines to make the same number of widgets.  
Five: In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake? 
Answer: 47 
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 Question five is another CRT question devised by Shane Frederick. This question, 
as do all the others, challenges System 2. The most popular answer to this question is 
twenty four. Individuals arrive at that answer due to System 1 playing majority of the role 
in the solution process. Individuals read the question and System 1 takes into 
consideration two main points, that it takes forty eight days to cover the entire lake and 
that the question is asking for the amount of days it would take to cover only half of the 
lake. Therefore, forty eight divided by two is twenty four and that must be the answer. 
System 1 fails to understand that the patch doubles in size every day. Therefore they 
disregard it and answer the question wrong. If the patch doubles in size every day, and on 
the forty eighth day it is completely covered, that means the day prior the patch only 
covered half the lake. 
Word Association 
Six: Cottage, Swiss, Cake 
Answer: Cheese 
 Question six involved a simple word association question. Unlike every other 
question on the survey, this question did not challenge System 2. It was meant to trigger 
only System 1. In most cases, it is expected that this question will be answered correctly, 
using the word cheese.  
Seven: Dive, Light, Rocket 
Answer: Sky 
 Unlike question six, this word association question is meant to challenge System 
2. In order to associate sky to these words, the participant will have to use System 2. The 
30 | P a g e  
 
three words Dive, Light and Rocket do not have a word that is as easily associated with, 
as did Cottage, Swiss and Cake. Words such as sky dive, skylight and skyrocket are not 
words often used by the average person. Therefore, these associations will not come to 
mind as easily. It is expected that most participants will answer this question incorrectly, 
due to cognitive easing and their lack of utilizing System 2. 
IV. Results and Discussion 
 
The results show that my initial hypothesis was correct to some degree. In the 
following section I will discuss the results of my experiment by specific questions. I will 
also attempt to reveal possible reasoning for the results. Initially I will discuss the results 
of questions one, two, four and five. I am grouping these questions together because they 
are of similar nature. Then I will discuss the results of question three. Finally I will 
discuss the results regarding the word association questions.  
A. Questions 1, 2, 4 & 5 
Among the undergraduate students, it is quite evident based on my research, that 
most of them were using System 1 rather than System 2 while solving the questions. On 
average, more students answered those questions incorrectly than correctly, with 81% 
answering question one incorrectly, 70% answering question two incorrectly, and 61% 
answering question five incorrectly (table 1.21). Question four had more correct results 
than incorrect but only by a very small margin with 52% answering the question correctly 
(table 1.2).   
                                                          
1Tables are being selected and referenced from the appendix on page 43 
 The results were quite different for the graduate students. As dictated by my 
research, on average more students answered the questions correctly than incorrectly, 
with 56% answering question one correctly, 74% answering question two correctly, 67% 
answering question four correctly, and 58% answering question five correctly
My reasoning behind this may be due to the graduate student’s higher degree of 
education as well as experience. As graduate students, these subjects had more exposure 
to the field of finance and may have adapted 
curriculum may have also include
biases and how to manage them appropriately. 
students take exams more seriously than undergraduate students do. They have a greater 
amount of investment lai
of cognitive strain. This higher cognitive strain
classes, exams, and projects more seriously, 
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 (table 1.3). 
 take their 
 
 B. Question 3 
 Question three allowed for a variety of answers and they were judged as correct or
incorrect based on the under/
Fifty. Some subjects left the question blank and therefore a third “no answer” response 
was added. Among the undergraduate students, 55% underestimated the murder rate 
while only 20% correctly or overestimated it, and 25% did not leave an answer
2.2). Even with 25% not knowing, there were significantly more subjects underestimating 
the number leading me to confidently state that 
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  The graduate student results again varied. Among this subject group, 37% 
underestimated the murder rate while 40% overestimated it, and 23% did not leave 
answer (table 2.3). While more 
the amount of people who left the answer blank can have a significant effect on the 
results. Therefore, it may not be statistically appropriate to make a conclusion regarding 
the absence of System 2. 
C. Word Association 
 The word association questions consisted of two separate questions. Question one 
adhered to System 1 and question two adhered to 
undergraduate students answered the first question
average, 59% answered question one correctly while only 5% answered question two 
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  The graduate students demonstrated similar results, except that on 
students answered question one incorrectly rather than the expected result of answering it 
correctly. On average 95% answered 
question two incorrectly (table 3.3)
portion of international students who were tested within the graduate group. Many of 
Pace University’s graduate students are international and their first language i
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V. Conclusion to the Experiment 
 
 As mentioned previously, my initial hypothesis was correct to some degree. In 
regards to the undergraduate students it is quite clear, as depicted in my results, that on 
average they are not using System 2 when making decisions. On the other hand, many of 
the graduate students answered more questions correctly than incorrectly, going against 
my initial hypothesis. As I have stated earlier, this could have occurred due to a few 
factors. Firstly, graduate students have a higher level of education. This higher education 
may have had an important impact on their performance on the questions, mainly the 
mathematical ones. Furthermore, the higher level of education may have exposed them to 
these very questions elsewhere, as they are not original. Therefore, through their higher 
education, the individuals where better equipped to control and regulate their use of 
system 1 and 2. Secondly, graduate students invest heavily in the graduate program they 
attend and therefore invest more in their assignments, in this case the questionnaire. This 
is especially true considering the fact that a graduate degree is not as much of a necessity 
as an undergraduate degree is in today’s world. Lastly, many of the graduate students 
tested were international students. Culturally speaking, test taking skills and education 
varies geographically. In some cultures exams and tests have higher importance and 
therefore these students would have more experience taking tests. This extra experience 
may have allowed them to better control their use of System 2, therefore resulting in 
more correct answers on this questionnaire. 
 As my research suggests, students who receive a graduate degree are not affected 
by cognitive ease as much as those who receive an undergraduate degree. This does not 
mean that they are immune to the cognitive folly. It only suggests that they are better 
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equipped, possibly through the higher education, experience, and investment, to deal with 
the folly and possibility of avoiding irrational behaviors and decisions. That being said, 
the business world is still plagued with individuals who are affected by cognitive ease. 
The U.S. Census reports, there were 347,985,000 undergraduate degrees in business 
compared to the 168,375,000 graduate degrees in business (Bureau 190-191). This poses 
a problem because there are more individuals in the field who are significantly more 
exposed to cognitive easing than there are those who may not be. Therefore, a major 
issue still stands and it must be mitigated. 
  




For years, the financial field has been considered more of a scientific and 
mathematical field than anything else. It is heavily based on financial, economic, and 
complex mathematical models. This is expected considering the rationality behind the 
sector. More recently though, it has become quite apparent that while the field requires 
rationality for complete efficiency the individuals who dedicate their lives to the financial 
sector do not always appear to behave in rational ways. Cognitive easing is a major 
culprit to why irrational behavior may occur, and its detrimental effect on the thinking 
process further enhances or even creates behavioral biases such as overconfidence, 
endowment and herding. 
As discussed in my research, with minor exceptions, on average most of the business 
students at Pace University showed high levels of cognitive easing affecting their 
thinking process. Many of them could not answer simple mathematical questions due to 
their minds reacting to the question in the least cognitive stressful manner. Instead of 
analyzing the question further, they assumed the already simple question was far simpler 
and in turn answered it incorrectly. These results merely show how susceptible 
individuals are (or in this case individuals in the business sector) to mental biases such as 
cognitive ease.  
This bias is carrying over past the university level and into the professional work 
place. Therefore, those individuals run the risk of making bad financial decisions for 
themselves, for their company, and even for society. Aside from cognitive easing directly 
causing an individual to make irrational decisions, this cognitive bias can also cause an 
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individual to become overconfident, endowed or partake in herding. These behavioral 
biases all produce irrational behaviors and in turn irrational decisions. Furthermore, if 
cognitive easing does not initiate these behavioral biases, it will instead add to the 
negative effects that result from these biases. In other words if an individual is already a 
victim of these behavioral biases cognitive easing will only enhance that behavior and all 
the irrationalities that accompany it.  
It is important that within the field of finance, along other business fields, there exists 
an understanding of the effects of both behavioral and cognitive biases. While the field of 
finance is based on rationality, those who dictate it unfortunately do not always behave 
rationally. Humans are flawed in that manner. They have the ability to create concepts of 
rationality and rules that are dictated by rationality, but they themselves cannot fully 
grasp rationality. Business professionals, whether they are executives, investors, or 
advisors, carry many responsibilities. Their decisions effect a wide array of individuals, 
not just themselves, and in a modern world such as today, where the entire market is 
interconnected and contagion is always a risk, they need to ensure their decisions are 
optimal and rational. It is not only important for a business professional to understand the 
science behind finance, but also the science of human behavior. These professionals need 
to understand the underlying processes that take place while a decision is being made and 
they need to understand the detrimental effects cognitive ease will have on the decision 
making process. 
Cognitive easing has clearly been an issue in the business world. Fortunately for 
professionals there are ways to prevent it from affecting their decision making process. 
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First and foremost, the business curriculum in all business schools and programs need to 
educate students about these biases at the undergraduate and graduate level. As stated 
previously, finance and business are highly affected by human behavior, emotion, and 
cognition. Therefore, educating future professionals about these biases can help to avoid 
irrationalities that are caused by them. Secondly, within firms and companies, 
management should hold monthly meetings, similar to those held regarding sexual abuse 
and safety, discussing the importance of rational behavior. These meetings will remind 
professionals that they are capable of making human errors and mistakes and allowing 
certain behaviors and cognitive biases to get the best of them. Even the most informed 
individual will sometimes forget, and reminding them, while it may be seen as time 
consuming, will unconsciously help them. Even a small note stating that 1+1 is not the 
same as 17*43 can help an individual realize his or her cognitive limitations. Lastly, 
when making decisions, professionals and executives should execute them during times 
when cognitive energy is at its peak. Cognitive ability is a vital resource to the decision 
making processes as are carbs to a marathon runner. Individuals need to make decisions 
at the middle of the day or at whatever time of day he or she has enough mental strength 
and effort. If an individual makes an important decision after a long hard day at work, 
cognitive ease will easily steer him or her away from using System 2 and only use 
System 1, resulting in a less optimal decision. 
If continued further with this experiment, I would have incorporated many other 
factors. I would have made a more comprehensive study measuring the effects of 
cognitive ease between the many disciplines within the business field as well as the 
differences between genders. Furthermore, studying the different levels of cognitive ease 
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between both international and local students would be interesting. Lastly, I would have 
liked to see the results of my experiment if a financial incentive had been present. 
Unfortunately there was not enough time and resources for me to fully incorporate all 
these extra factors, but it is definitely something to consider if one were to continue this 
research further. 
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   Incorrect   
34% 71 66% 
48% 56 52% 
58% 45 42% 
47% 57 53% 
   Incorrect   
19% 52 81% 
30% 45 70% 
52% 31 48% 
39% 39 61% 
  Incorrect   
56% 19 44% 
74% 11 26% 
67% 14 33% 
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4 51 48% 
Graduate 43 
Question  Under   Over
4 16 37% 
Undergraduate 64 
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No 
answer   
30 28% 26 24% 
   
No 
answer   
17 40% 10 23% 
Over   
No 
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Incorrect   
 54 50% 
 101 94% 
 
Incorrect   
 26 41% 
 61 95% 
  Incorrect   
 28 65% 
7% 40 93% 
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This Questionnaire will be used as research for a future thesis. No personal information will be made public. Any information 
collected from this questionnaire will remain anonymous throughout the research, without any knowledge of whom as 
completed it.  
 
Major: _________________________              Student Standing: ____________________ 
 




 A bat and ball cost $1.10 
 The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. 
 How much does the ball cost? 
 
 Answer: ___________________________ 
2. 
 All roses are flowers  
 Some flowers fade quickly  
 Therefore some roses fade quickly. 
 
 True or False?  _______________________ 
3. 
 Approximately how many murders occur in the state of Michigan in one year? 
 
 Answer: _____________________ 
4. 
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets?  
 A) 100 Minutes 
 B) 5 Minutes 
5. 
 In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half 
of the lake?  
 
A) 24 days  
B) 47 days. 
 
Think of a word that associates with the following three words. 
 
1. Cottage, Swiss, Cake 
Answer: 
 
2. Dive, Light, Rocket 
Answer:  
 
Thank you for your participation. 
